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THE MODERN RELEVANCE OF LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY AND RIGHT INTENTION IN THE
JUST WAR TRADITION
Antonio F. Perez'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Father Schall's insightful comment on the "justice and prudence" of
"this war" masterfully demonstrates the continuing relevance of the just
war tradition to modern debate on the use of force. Perhaps the legal
categories governing war have changed since the time of St. Augustine.
Today, lawyers addressing the question of legality, both as a matter of
domestic constitutional law and as a matter of international law, tend
rather to frame the question as one of "use of force" or "armed conflict"
rather than war. In the public dialogue concerning the United States and
alliance response to the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center
of September 11, 2001, moral and legal issues will tend to converge,
regardless of how a lawyer would initially frame the question.' To the
extent, therefore, that the insights yielded by the branch of moral theory
reflected in the just war tradition reflects a well-rooted core of moral
truth, the Catholic Church's teaching cannot be ignored in the ongoing
debate over what to do in this wholly unprecedented situation.
The contribution is also timely and the editors of the Law Review of
the Catholic University of America should be commended for their
judgment in inviting Father Schall to use this forum to stimulate public
discussion of the continuing relevance of the just war tradition.
Although the just war tradition has been firmly grounded in the tradition
of the Church, only in the last decade through its inclusion in the
Church's catechism has it become part of the Church's official teaching.2
' Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, The Columbus School
of Law. I want to thank the editors of the Law Review for their invitation to comment on
Father Schall's contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the relevance of Just War
theory to the current situation. I would also like to thank Maryann Cusimano for her
comments on my paper.

1. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xxvii (1977) ("Policy-oriented lawyers are in fact moral and
political philosophers, and it would be best if they presented themselves that way.").
2. RODGER CHARLES S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
55 (1999) (citing CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1996)).
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Thus, in explaining the philosophic roots of the just war tradition and its
connection with moral virtue, Father Schall also has performed a
valuable service, heeding the call of the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops that "people of good will are called to ... teaching the
principles of the Church's just war tradition."3 Moreover, Father Schall's
essay provides a conceptual framework for understanding the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishop's own Statement of November 14,
2001, which itself also invoked the just war tradition in its analysis of the
moral criteria governing the appropriate response to these attacks.4
My only disappointment, both with Father Schall's essay and with the
Catholic Conference statement, however, is that neither goes far enough
in extracting from the just war tradition wisdom that can guide the
United States and its allies in the full range of decisions that remain to be
made in this crisis. For we need guidance not only on the traditional jus
in bello concerns of avoidance of unnecessary harm to the innocent and
conducting this "war" in a manner that achieves true peace and justice as
between the combatants and the innocent victims, but also for the
threshold jus ad bellum questions of legitimate authority and right
intention. It may seem as though these questions are behind us. Thus,
with respect to the decisions taken thus far to use force, Father Shall
states merely that "the proper political authority was invoked and the
right intention war articulated."
And the Conference of Catholic
Bishops' Statement has nothing substantial to say on these questions.5
For policymakers, however, the adoption of a congressional war
powers resolution and the assertion of a right under article 51 of the UN
Charter to engage in self-defense do not dispose entirely of the question
of the legitimacy of the authority for the conduct of this war. That is
because the "war" to which both Father Schall and the Catholic
Conference refer has not yet been properly defined, leaving its true
scope and the identity of all its targets a continuing question of public
choice. Thus far, the initial targets of the use of force have been the al
Qaeda network, which we believe is principally responsible for
September 11; then the Taliban regime, which we believe had given al
3. Press Release, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Efforts Against
Terrorism Require Resolve, Restraint, Long-term on Justice and Peace, Bishops Declare
(Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/comm/archives/2001/01-200.htm.
4. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Pastoral Message: Living With
Faith and Hope After September 11 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://
www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/septl I .htm.
5. See id. Although it appends the portions of its earlier statement on the just war

tradition, "The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace" (1993), the statement reiterates the
requirements of "Legitimate authority" and "Right Intention". Id.
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Qaeda material and moral support; and, finally, the state of Afghanistan,
which we believe was largely under Taliban control. Yet, President
Bush's earliest articulation of war aims goes well beyond even this
slippery slope of potential targets. Whether these targets may be
expanded are matters, as I will describe below, that remain in some
doubt as a matter of law. It may be that some political bargaining may
well be necessary, both at the domestic and international levels, before
"legitimate" authority is obtained by the United States and its allies as
this war continues. But any bargains we may have already made tacitly,
or may well in the future make explicitly, to obtain the appearance of
legitimate authority may well in turn compromise the "rightness" of our
intentions. For example, expanding the definition of "terrorists" to
include those resisting "tyranny" in states whose support we find crucial,
could well turn our war against terrorism into a pretext for reshaping the
international order in a way that suits our broader, yet more selfish,
national interests. Surely the just war tradition has something relevant
to say on that.
In this brief comment, I want to argue, without making any definite
judgments about the current situation, that our understanding of the just
war should pay attention to the questions of legitimate authority and
right intention for use of force. To do this, we should take into account
the procedural values of modern constitutional democracy and
transnational governance. We should also consider the intentions
established through the political processes legitimating those war aims as
the relevant intentions for assessing whether the use of force comports
with the moral criteria of the just war. Indeed, if the just war's aims are
not publicly justified through a relevant political process, how can we be
confident that right intention springs from legitimate authority or that
either reflects the measure of the prudence, or other characteristic
virtues of the Christian character, that must be evidenced in every
judgment of practical reason for the sake of the common good?
II. THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
While secular versions of the just war tradition originated in the
practical power politics of the Greek city-states and the Roman republic,
the Catholic Christian's beginning point must be the question: "Why not
pacifism rather than war?" For the first three centuries at least of the
Christian era, for example, when Christians were not in state power and
instead faced the power of an unjust state, Biblical commands against
taking of life, even at the cost of submitting to evil authority, generally
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took precedence.' When Christians took power, the Imperial Roman
State became the vehicle for establishing good order through which, in
theory at least, the common good could be pursued. Defense of that
state became a moral possibility, and St. Augustine's reformulation of
just war doctrine facilitated that doctrinal shift.
Because Augustine argued that Christian participation in the imperial
armies to kill the enemies of Rome was morally defensible, the key first
move in his argument was that the Christian emperor could command his
soldiers to kill in defense of the Empire. The authority of the Emperor,
beginning with Constantine's charismatic claim that God was on his side
at Milvian Bridge, could be partially legitimated in theological terms.
The great disorder of the fourth and early fifth centuries, moreover,
compelled Augustine to see the virtues of pacifism as subordinate to the
need for order; consequently, he emphasized the basic illegitimacy of
bands of armed men acting essentially as criminals dispossessing the
Christian inhabitants of the empire of their worldly goods and even their
lives.
This did not mean that great states were necessarily virtuous, for
Augustine recalled the ancient tale of the garden-variety pirate who,
when captured by Alexander the Great, dared to accuse the conqueror of
the known world of being nothing more than a pirate on a somewhat
grander scale.8 Thus acknowledging that great states too can act much
like criminals, Augustine made provision for the moral authority of the
Church to guide the state in the exercise of its judgment. 9 He may have
been closer to the truth of his own time than even he himself may have
feared, for, as Roland Bainton has persuasively argued, it was Emperor
Valens' own bad faith, including the breaking of his pledge to the
barbarian tribes living north of the Danube to permit their settlement
inside the empire, that led to a final attack on his forces at the decisive
battle of Adrianople in 378 A.D. and the final destruction of the imperial
army as a bulwark against barbarian invasion."' In sum, Augustine's
hierarchical view of the political and moral universe made the claim of
6.

See generally ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS WAR

AND PEACE 66-84 (1960).

7. See id. at 93 (appealing to the Roman General Boniface to continue to defend
Africa from the barbarians rather than retire to the monastery).
8. Ian A. McLean, Criminal Law and the Natural Law, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 259, 265 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2000) (quoting ST.
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, 112-13 (Marcus Dodds trans., 1950)).
9. ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTENDOM: A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
AND ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION 129 (1964).
10. CHRISTIAN ATrITUDES, supra note 6, at 100.
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legitimacy of the authority calling on Christians to kill central to his
teaching."
By parity of reasoning, the conscience of the ruler commanding what
would otherwise be murder, like the conscience of the combatant
himself, could be free from sin if the right mental intention could be
established. The relevance of the just war criteria of legitimate authority
and right intention should now be clear.
Practical reason requires
deliberation concerning the relation between considerations of prudence
and moral precepts in the pursuit of a vision of the good. 2 When public
authority is involved, practical reason requires deliberation instead
directed toward the pursuit of the common good. 3 Thus, the heart of the
matter is that decisions, under the natural law background to the just war
doctrine, reflect the exercise of right reason-that is, "reason unfettered
by emotional or other impediments to choosing consistently with what
reason fully requires.' 4 Deliberation about the common good, with the
assurance that "emotional or other impediments"-such as the desire for
vengeance, xenophobia or other prejudices, or naked lust for power or
greed-do not impair the exercise of right reason, is best conducted in
public and under procedures that ensure the participation of all those to
whose good an action is directed. Modern natural law reasoning,
moreover, emphasizes the need for moral discourse within the context of
a social community, and correlatively of public justification for
competing visions of the common good, rather than "from the standpoint
of an isolated non-social individual."' 5 Indeed, those committed to
political democracy within the pluralist international, and perhaps even
domestic, context as the means for searching for the common good can
find authority for this view in a reading of Thomas Aquinas's
understanding of natural law in the reconciliation of faith and reason, an
approach which makes clear that the pursuit of truth requires recognition
of the "goodness and value of things human which are not explicitly
dependent on their place in Christian salvation.",16 While broad public
11. See PAUL E. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 29-30 (1971).
12. Robert George, Natural Law and Positive Law, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 151, 155 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2000).
13. McLean, supra note 8, at 265.
14. George, supra note 12, at 154-55.
15. Alasdair Macintyre, Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced
Modernity, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 90, 112
(Edward B. McLean ed., 2000).
16. Rev. John Jenkins, C.S.C., Aquinas, Natural Law, and the Challenges of Diversity,
in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL

McLean ed., 2000).

LAW 57, 67 (Edward B.
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discussion of the requirements of the common good cannot absolutely
guarantee that public authorities pursue the common good, at least the
public exercise of right reason will make clear to humanity the actual
purpose and likely effect of the proposed course of actions.
For Christian lawyers concerned about the application of just war
criteria to the suppression of international terrorism, and our implied
claim to treat terrorists as combatant war criminals, rather than as mere
perpetrators of common crimes, the legitimization as a matter of
domestic and international law of our course of action is a pressing issue.
For the United States, the legitimacy of the authority for the use of force,
the unleashing of war, must be tested, not by the charismatic authority of
the Prince, but rather by the constitutionally prescribed authorities of the
President and the Congress. For the United States, as a member of the
international community, its authority as a nation to use force may well
be tested under international law. The U.S. Congress and the UN
Security Council are important, albeit not the exclusive, fora for these
ordeals. Some have argued that, even in the international response to
the Iraqi attack on Kuwait a decade ago, the Security Council added
"little to the moral, or even the legal, argument."17 Yet, surely no one
will claim that President Bush's private views constitute the relevant set
of intentions for the initiation or conduct of this war under either
domestic or international law. Thus, the explanation given by the United
States and its allies to the Security Council and the reaction of the world
community to that explanation must be relevant to a moral, and certainly
a legal, analysis of the question. If we have followed the procedures
required under both the U.S. Constitution and the UN Charter systems
of discursive justification, and in that context explained the reasons for
which the war is launched, then perhaps the justice of our cause will be
reaffirmed, the clarity of our commitment to act in the common good will
be manifest, and the public's confidence in the continuing justice of our
course of action will be reinforced.
Now, under this approach, when war is unleashed not by a single ruler
but rather by a lawfully constituted authority in accordance with the
norms governing that decision making process, the claims of pacifism can
be resisted under a modern reformulation of St. Augustine's just war
doctrine. If, on the other hand, a state which directs Christians to kill is
not acting within the scope of its authority to act for the common good or
with the intention of furthering that common good, then we can properly
question whether the Christian ethic of pacifism becomes a more
17.

WALZER, supra note 1, at xxii.
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compelling moral option. It appears that at least a significant minority of
the membership of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
who opposed the Conference's own statement on November 14, 2001, on
the aftermath of September 11, may have come to this conclusion.'8 Why
should that be so in the present circumstances, when Father Schall and
the majority of the Bishops have made so compelling a case for the
justness of the cause to defend the innocents murdered by the al Qaeda
network and its supporters and the strength of the United States and
allied claim that all peaceful measures have been exhausted, making the
attack on the Taliban truly our last resort?
III.

THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL AUTHORITY

The Bush administration faces some difficult choices in the near future,
mainly in selecting among the range of policy options involving the use of
force. The most pressing factor in making these choices is, obviously,
their potential efficacy in deterring future terrorist attacks on the United
States and its allies. These difficult choices may depend on the
availability of diplomatic options that, together with the threat of
potential military action, could somehow persuade terrorist adversaries
of the United States and its allies that the price they will pay far exceeds
any potential gains. But the most important strategic question seems to
be whether to expand this "war" beyond the current use of force against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. That said, the Bush
administration itself also faces a potential price in international and
domestic consensus if it were to escalate, and perhaps even if it were
merely to threaten to use force, without the specific consent of either the
UN Security Council or the U.S. Congress. Already the Administration
has tested these waters in a message to the Security Council reserving the
right to do so under article 51 of the UN Charter, a step that has already
rankled even key NATO members of the coalition President Bush has
18.

Alan Cooperman, Roman Catholic Bishops Declare U.S. War is Moral: But

Poverty and Injustice at Root of Terrorism Should be Addressed, PastoralStatement Says,

WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2001, at A37.
19. Colum Lynch & Steven Mufson, U.S. Reserves Right to Attack State Sponsors Of
Terrorists; U.N. CharterRecognizes Acts Of Self-Defense, Envoy Says, WASH. POST, Oct.
9. 2001, at A13 ("In a letter to the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations John D. Negroponte said the strikes underway against Afghanistan are acts of
self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter."); Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/946, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1281
(Sept. 2001).
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assembled through skillful public and private diplomacy and may well
provoke an early skirmish with Congress."'
The questions, thus, are whether the United States already has all the

legal authority necessary under international law and whether the
executive branch has all the authority it needs under domestic
constitutional law to execute any conceivable range of military options
necessary to achieve the United State's political objectives in a war
against terrorism. The answers to these questions, however, are not so
clear. Surely no one would argue that the recent congressional
resolution authorizing the use of force by the United States in response
to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are a blank
check of war-making authority to the executive branch." Indeed, there is
some indication, though there is also evidence to the contrary, that the
Bush administration sought but was denied the equivalent of an explicit
declaration by Congress of the existence of the state of war between the

United States and states harboring terrorists."

Despite its adoption at

lighting speed, Congress should not be understood to have enacted a

20. Judy Dempsey & Carola Hoyos, Attack on Afghanistan Politics - US Warns it
May Attack Other States, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001 ("The US intention to possibly widen its
military campaign has already raised serious questions among Security Council
members.").
21. The executive branch has consistently taken the position that a congressional
authorization is superfluous as a matter of constitutional law when the President acts
within his so-called inherent constitutional authority to "repel sudden attacks" even
against U.S. citizens abroad. See, e.g., Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (1860) (holding
that presidential directive lawful defense to action of trespass against U.S. military officer
for use of force in Greytown, Nicaragua to protect American nationals). Read in this
context, the plain words of the resolution might be read broadly, although the text of the
resolution itself only grants the executive branch authority limited through critical
qualifying language as to the "appropriateness" of the use of force and only as to targets
bearing a specified level of culpability. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United
States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched
Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001), reprinted in
40 I.L.M. 1282 (Sept. 2001). The Joint Resolution authorized the President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Id.
22. Edward Alden, Assault on American Politics - Sweeping Powers for Bush Brings
Memories of Vietnam, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001 (reporting that Congress "refused
[President Bush's] request for unlimited authority to 'deter and prevent' any future
terrorist strikes against the US").
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second Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 23 The precise scope of this congressional

authorization to use force remains to be interpreted authoritatively.
President Bush's 1990-91 decision to rely, in part, on the explicit

congressional authorization for launching operation Desert Storm, an
authorization granted in the context of an explicit executive branch
threat backed by prior UN Security Council authorization to forcibly
expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, should serve as a precedent.
This
second Bush administration might be counseled to seek additional

congressional authorization when, and if, significant military operations
outside Afghanistan become a serious policy option.
With respect to its international legal authority, the administration is
likely to consider the need for explicit Security Council authorization for

the use of force in terms of its impact on the coalition.

Indeed, the best

may become the enemy of the good if the administration overreaches
and thereby undermines international political consensus necessary to
ensure full implementation of the unprecedented non-military sanctions

the Security Council has already imposed or prevents the adoption of any
additional economic sanctions should they become necessary. Some
may argue that the "inherent" right of self-defense in the face of an
"armed attack," under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, already grants the
United States all the authority it needs25 -- indeed, even that it trumps a

23.

Id.

Congress's actions on the resolution was the swiftest since the Tonkin Gulf
resolution, which passed with only two dissenting votes just five days after a
North Vietnamese attack against U.S. destroyers. The Tonkin vote authorized
the president to "take all necessary steps, including the use of force" to aid US
allies in south-east Asia.
Id.

24. While the Bush administration formally reserved its constitutional position,
maintaining that congressional authorization was not constitutionally required, it
nonetheless acted in compliance with the resolution by filing the report to Congress
required under the resolution to trigger its validity as a source of constitutional authority.
Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Sec. 2(b), H.J. Res. 77,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 12, 1991) ("Before exercising the authority granted ... the
President shall make available to [Congress] his determination that ... the United States
has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by
Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions ....); see also President Bush's
Letter to Congress Re: Attack on Iraq, Jan. 16, 1991, and accompanying Report, reprinted
in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 911 (1999).

25. See generally I.L.M. Special Section on Terrorism-Related Documents, 40 I.L.M.
1254 (Sept. 2001) (supplying an impressive collection of statements from the EU, OAS,
NATO, OECD, UN General Assembly, and UN Security Council, albeit not through a
chapter VII resolution, generally buttressing the view that the United States' right to selfdefense in this case is widely recognized internationally).
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UN Charter-based collective security system that is now defunct, as some
have argued, even as to humanitarian intervention. Certainly, NATO,
which most everyone recognizes as a collective security organization
foreseen by the UN Charter as the potential beneficiary of UN Security
Council authorization for the use of force, has already termed the attack
on the World Trade Center an "armed attack" for purposes of the
NATO treaty's collective security commitment." The legal rub is that
NATO's judgment about what constitutes an "armed attack" is not
binding on the Security Council or the International Court of Justice,
each of which has taken positions in past cases and incidents at variance
with the broader U.S. interpretation of the inherent right of self-defense
and certainly at variance with the view that any terrorist attack
sponsored, or acquiesced in, by a state justifies the use of force to punish
those responsible or even to prevent further such attacks."' Indeed, were
the United States to act without Security Council authorization, it might
be setting a precedent that could justify Russian or Chinese action in
26. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of
the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 3, 18 (2000) (suggesting that the fact that the "international legal process
is more able than constitutive structures of the past to compel the provision of remedies
for some grave human rights violations is a cause for satisfaction"). Compare Michael
Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for Just International Law, 79 FOREIGN
AFF. 2 (1999) (describing Kosovo intervention by NATO without prior UN authorizing
resolution as paradigm shift), with Thomas Franck, Sidelined in Kosovo?: The United
Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated - Break It, Don't Fake It, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 2
(1999) (describing Kosovo action as an aberration rather than the rule). Former Acting
State Department Legal Adviser, Michael J. Matheson, lucidly describes a range of
competing positions on the interface between law and morality of humanitarian
intervention in the absence of explicit Security Council authorization, as follows: legal;
prohibited; prohibited under the Charter but in the process of legalization as a matter of
custom; and prohibited by both Charter and customary law but nonetheless justifiable on
moral grounds. Michael J. Matheson, Just War and Humanitarian Intervention: Comment
on the Grotius Lecture by Jean Bethke Elshtain, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 27, 29-30 (2001).
27. Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 2 October 2001,
reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1268 (Sept. 2001) (confirming that the attack was from a source
outside the United States); Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1267 (Sept. 2001) (invoking the collective
security provisions of NATO with respect to an "armed attack" on a NATO member,
conditional on finding that the attack on the United States was "directed from abroad").
28. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, [Nicaragua v.
United States of America], 1986 l.C.J. Rep. 14, 103-23, paras. 195-238 (discussing limits on
"inherent right" of individual and collective self-defense); see also S.C. Res. 573, U.N.
SCOR (1986) (condemning Oct. 1, 1985, Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis,
despite Israeli claim of a right to act in its self-defense when Tunisia was harboring known
terrorists who would commit future terrorist acts against Israel); Gregory H. Fox,
Addendum to ASIL Insight on Terrorist Attacks, Sept. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights.htm.
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neighboring states on the pretext of the suppression of domestic and
international terrorism.
But the moral force of an explicit Security Council authorization is not
unproblematic either. 29
Perhaps most important, however, seeking
Russian and Chinese support for a Security Council resolution explicitly
authorizing U.S. use of force might invite either or both countries to seek
in return explicit U.S. recognition of the "terrorist" character of national
minorities within Russia and China who now claim the right to selfdetermination and, perhaps, even secession.
Accordingly, what this
administration should not do is seek Security Council authorization for
the use of force, as the Bush administration arguably did in 1990,' {} in
order to facilitate the adoption of a congressional resolution in January
1991 authorizing the use of force against Iraq.3 A Security Council
resolution should be sought this time only after clear domestic
authorization is available. In that way, the risk that the administration
will bargain away the fates of subject peoples elsewhere could be
lessened.
IV. CONCLUSION

The questions raised here concerning the domestic and international
political and legal processes are relevant to a moral argument that jus ad
bellum criteria of legitimate authority and right intention have been met
in the current campaign in Afghanistan. No doubt some, such as the
minority faction of the Conference of Catholic Bishops who preferred to
hold to the background position of Christian pacifism even in this case,
might have been entitled to stake out a moral-based claim - seeking

29.

See LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY

IN A

ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD 102 (1994) (arguing that ex ante consent to use of force
authorized in accordance with Security Council procedures helps to legitimate use of force
to enforce international law against a sovereign state that is a member of the United
Nations). Afghanistan's lack of participation in the UN, through the non-recognition by
the UN of the Taliban Government, may well have attenuated the force of its ex ante

consent to the procedures and authorities of chapter VII of the UN Charter.
30. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR (1990) (authorizing "all necessary means to uphold
and implement" prior Security Council resolutions, among other things, requiring the

withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait).
31. The Iraq War Powers Resolution provided in relevant part:
The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use the United States
Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
(1990) in order to achieve the implementation of Security Council Resolutions
[adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter with respect to Iraq's unlawful
occupation of Kuwait].

Id.

26
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more political process, more public debate, more thoughtful deliberation
- before the military operation in Afghanistan was launched. One can
easily see, as Father Schall has persuasively argued, that the better case
on grounds of just cause and necessity was for more immediate action to
capture or kill the threat posed by Osama bin Laden himself and his
network of operatives. But as we move farther away from those narrow
war aims, the demands of legitimate political authority and right
intention surely become more compelling. If this war is to expand,
therefore, our moral position will surely be buttressed if we err on the
side of caution in exhausting the procedural mechanism made available
by domestic and international legal frameworks. The pragmatism of the
first Bush administration should thus, in the second Bush administration,
give way instead to moral prudence.

